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Abstract: China’s public security forces are employing more and more technology 
in their push for an ‘informatization (信息化)’ of their police work. The application 
of analytical techniques for solving past crimes or preventing future crimes based on 
big data analysis is thereby a key component of China’s approach for technology-led 
policing. China’s holistic policy approach for the purpose of maintaining social stability 
that is encompassing an ever-growing range of societal issues, the vast investments of its 
police forces in new technologies and its paramount objective of security, that clearly 
supersedes inter alia concerns of privacy or transparency, may be considered extremely 
conducive to the establishment of effective predictive policing in China. This paper 
however argues, that the application of predictive policing in China is heavily flawed as 
the systemic risks and pitfalls of predictive policing cannot be mitigated but are rather 
exacerbated by China’s approach towards policing and its criminal justice system. It is 
therefore to be expected that predictive policing in China will mainly be a more refined 
tool for the selective suppression of already targeted groups by the police and does not 
substantially reduce crime or increase overall security.   
Introduction
The Chinese police are often heavily criticized by the Chinese public for its lack of 
effectiveness and its deficient work style (Wong 2012, 152-6; Yang 2017, 78). In 
recent years, however, security forces in China were able to at least partly refute this 
criticism, when they were repeatedly able to apprehend long-time fugitives and finally 
bring them to justice. One example is a certain Mr. Ding, who went missing after he 
allegedly committed a murder in 2001. In early 2017, a facial recognition tool found 
a matching Mr. Ma on the internet, which led to telecommunication surveillance and 
finally his arrest in Korla, Xinjiang Province. Reportedly, the murderous Mr. Ding was 
one of more than 43.000 fugitives arrested by the Chinese police with the help of data 
technology between March and December 2017 alone (Chen 2019).
The rising use of big data analysis by the police in its investigations is however just a first 
step of a larger agenda envisioned by the Chinese regime. The final goal is to develop 
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instruments and methodologies that can not only ex post enforce the (criminal) law but 
that are also devices to ultimately predict and prevent crimes. This development gained 
substantial momentum in China when Xi Jinping announced at a security conference in 
2016:
‘We shall attach additional importance to an integrated harmonization 
and to a reformed public policy, attach additional importance to the 
democratic rule of law and to technological innovation; we shall raise 
the socialization, the level of the rule of law, the smartness and the 
professionalism of our social governance and raise the ability to predict, 
warn against and prevent any kind of risks. […] We shall perfect our 
social governance mechanisms for public security and speedily work 
on the integration and informatization of the prevention and control 




信息化社会治安防控体系.’ (Xi Jinping 2016).
In this speech, Xi outlines a highly integrated framework of public security measures 
that are not limited to police measures but are rather part of a larger policy approach 
for which his administration coined the phrase ‘social governance (社会治理)’. Its 
central goal of ‘maintaining stability (维稳)’ is neither new nor innovative as it has been 
at the heart of China’s domestic policies since the Hu Jintao administration (2003-
2013) under the term of ‘social management (社会管理)’, which according to Pieke 
(2012, 159-60) aligned itself with corporatist ideas of indirect regulation while still 
maintaining a socialist approach that entails the feasibility of social engineering. The 
gradual shift towards more ‘governance’ instead of ‘management’ under XI Jinping 
widened the scope of active government involvement again (Wei 2019) and thereby 
also broadened the regime’s demand for information through extensive surveillance. 
The most notorious example of this overarching policy approach is the establishment 
of China’s Social Credit System (社会信用体系), which is meant to process a plethora 
of data from different areas to assess the trustworthiness of persons and corporations 
for the purpose of enhancing their obedience to legal and even ethical norms (Chen, 
Cheung 2014). 
The recent efforts of digitalization and automatization in the prevention of any kind of 
deviance, as seen in the Social Credit System, are manifestations of a larger trajectory 
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in China’s public security. More and more areas are considered relevant issues for 
maintaining social stability in China, so that not only the security forces as such were 
constantly growing in size and importance, but this also means that an ever-increasing 
number of policy fields are drawn into what Wang and Minzer (2015, 357) describe as 
a ‘pluralization of security work’. This expansion of competence and workload is met by 
the Chinese police by a serious push towards ‘informatization of policing (警务信息
化)’, which is generally describing the comprehensive use of information technologies 
in all areas of the police work and the collection and processing of high volumes of data 
(Schwarck 2018, 9-11; Zheng 2019, 15-6). Given these developments, China may be in 
the position to establish a highly efficient system of predictive policing. 
Conceptualizations, problematizations and definitions of predictive policing in the 
English-language literature are mainly based on a handful of trailblazing examples 
that were set up in the US. These analyses are most often highly contextualized in that 
the specific predictive policing tool as well as the police culture and approach towards 
policing of the respective police departments, especially regarding transparency and 
potential racial bias, are taken into account and discussed from the perspective of 
the US’ constitutional order (Hunt et al. 2014, Saunders et al. 2016, Selbst 2017, 
Ferguson 2017b, Griffard 2019). The most prevalent definition can thereby probably 
be found in the RAND Corporation’s early study on the matter, which defines 
predictive policing as the ‘application of analytical techniques—particularly quantitative 
techniques—to identify likely targets for police intervention and prevent crime or 
solve past crimes by making statistical predictions’ (Perry et al. 2013, XIII). A more 
recent definition was proposed by Meijer and Wessels, who based their analysis on a 
literature review and summarize predictive policing as ‘the collection and analysis of 
data about previous crimes for identification and statistical prediction of individuals 
or geospatial areas with an increased probability of criminal activity to help to develop 
policing intervention and prevention strategies and tactics’ (2019, 1037). While 
none of these definitions included observations of the Chinese efforts in predictive 
policing and may not be entirely apt to encompass the Chinese approaches in this 
field, the more abstract considerations presented in this English-language scholarship 
may still be particularly instructive in assessing the possibility for effective predictive 
policing in China. A core question of this paper is therefore, if China can overcome 
the problems and drawbacks frequently discussed in the context of predictive policing 
in general. Particularly, China’s ‘pluralized’ approach to security work and the apparent 
ability of its police to use a wide array of data as the ‘prediction stage’ of the criminal 
procedure in China is not limited by law (Pei Wei 2018, 56) may have the potential to 
bring forth a more holistic predictive policing regime that not only relies on previous 
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crimes to forecast future crimes but encompasses many issues that could lead to the 
occurrence of crime. Such an approach would then be very well equipped to mitigate 
the problem of not clearly distinguishing correlation and causation, which Chan and 
Bennet Moses describe as the latent fallacy of Big Data analysis in criminology (2016, 
34). China’s broad perspective on social stability could make the surveillance of a broad 
range of (social) issues operational for its version of predictive policing and thereby 
could avoid what Bennet Moses and Chan more specifically criticize as an ‘exclusive 
focus on crime prevention’ (2018, 815), which may counterproductively block out 
other factors that influence public order as the overarching goal of effective policing 
(Dixon 2005, 17-8). Even more importantly, China’s police may have broad access 
to any kind of data without substantial restrictions concerning due process standards 
(generally on this issue in China, e.g. Nesossi 2019, 495-6), which, from solely a 
public security perspective, would allow a far more effective form of data-led policing. 
Schwarck therefore argues that China will create a ‘public security apparatus more 
adept at reading the causes of criminality and disorder, and responding accordingly’ 
(2018, 19). This paper however argues that China’s efforts to build-up its capacities in 
predictive policing are systemically flawed. Success in this area is not only depended on 
the volume of accessible data and the installed computing power, but it hinges also on 
the quality of the available data (Ferguson 2017b, 1145-50) and the ability to critically 
evaluate procedures and outcomes without fixed expectations regarding the results 
(Bennet Moses, Chan 2018, 815-7). While police data in general appears to be already 
inherently biased (Joh 2017, 295-302), Chinese crime data is also heavily influenced 
by political considerations (Xu 2018, 166-170) and even the underlying police dossiers 
on criminal cases may very easily not reflect the actual situation (Mou 2017, 85). Using 
this kind of data as a basis for a predictive model certainly cannot safeguard accurate 
forecasting of crime that guides police strategies and tactics. Additionally, legal oversight 
and scrutiny of police operations are notoriously weak in China (Schwarck 2018, 20), 
intra-departmental conflicts regarding the value of computerized data analysis for the 
policing strategy and operational tactics (Guan, Sun 2020, 75-6) and the enormous 
propaganda value of predictive policing for the regime’s legitimacy may render any 
efforts to critically evaluate China’s use of big data in its policing moot and futile.
While there is still no nationwide program or concept for predictive policing in China, 
there are however local projects that make use of analytical data technology (e.g. in 
Zhongshan, Guangzhou and Hangzhou, Zhejiang) and several specific crimes (e.g. 
drug-related crimes and telecommunication fraud) are targeted by predictive policing 
measures in China. Additionally, the pervasive surveillance of the entire (Muslim) 
population in Xinjiang produces high volumes of data that are used for operational 
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purposes in China’s ‘People’s War against Terror’, which is at times also described as 
predictive policing (Human Rights Watch 2019). In the following, this article will 
give an overview of ongoing predictive policing programs and related technology- and 
data-driven undertakings of the Chinese security apparatus in the context of China’s 
comprehensive approach towards maintaining order. Based on these observations, 
China’s potential for an effective predictive policing will be analyzed by scrutinizing the 
availability of possible solutions for the inherent flaws of predictive policing that are 
frequently conceptualized in the existing English-language literature on the matter.   
Technology, Big Data and the Chinese Police
The promise of faster, more cost-effective and efficient policing by using technology 
(Brayne 2017, 981-2; Ferguson 2017a, 31-3) is certainly also a driving force for 
the establishment of predictive policing tools in China. This Chapter outlines 
early and ongoing undertakings of the Chinese police to integrate information and 
communications technologies in their operations and develop strategies that are 
based on Big data analysis. While not every project in this field in China can be 
mentioned here, the aim of the following discussion is to illustrate a trajectory towards a 
comprehensive and nationwide solution for a technology-aided or even technology-led 
policing that would fundamentally change police practices in China and is ultimately 
conducive to a shift from reactive to predictive policing. 
The growth in size and importance of the Chinese public security apparatus in at least 
the last fifteen years (Wang, Minzer 2015, 342) was accompanied by a substantial 
investment in modern technologies and ‘the emergence of the Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS) as a powerhouse in computerized surveillance’ (Schwarck 2018, 21). 
The extensive employment of data and technology by the Chinese police is described 
by several interconnected terms, which use a slightly shifting focus from ‘intelligence-
led [in the sense of effectively using information] policing (情报指导警务)’ to an 
‘informatization [in the sense of using information technologies] of policing (警务信
息化)’ and finally an integrated notion of ‘intelligent policing  (智慧警务)’. The latter 
approach is fairly comprehensively outlined in a normative document jointly issued 
by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council in 
2015 titled ‘Opinions on the further development of a prevention and control system of 
public security’: 2
2 中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅印发《关于加强社会治安防控体系建设的意见》, 13-04-
2015, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0414/c1001-26839083.html (Accessed 23-02-20).
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‘The informatization of public security prevention and control will 
be incorporated in the overall plan for the development of intelligent 
cities. [We will make] ample use of technologies such as the internet 
of a new age, the internet of things, Big Data, cloud computing and 
systems for smart sensing, remote sensing, satellite positioning and 
geographic information. [We will] innovate tools for public security 
prevention and control, and thusly raise the level of digitalization, 
interconnectedness and smartness of the public security management 






This documents also puts forward a vision for the ultimate purpose of this build-up 
of the Chinese police’s technological arsenal by explicitly pointing towards predictive 
policing:
‘[We will] strengthen the deeply coordinated use of information 
resources and make ample use of modern technologies, so that 
our abilities of automated prevention and suppression of crime are 
heightened. -  强化信息资源深度整合应用，充分运用现代信息技
术，增强主动预防和打击犯罪的能力.’
When in 2016 Meng Jianzhu still headed the Commission for Politics and Law (政法
委员会) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is the central oversight organ 
in all legal matters of the one-party state (Fu 2013, 76-88), he already lined out more 
specific notions of predictive policing:
‘We have to improve our use of smart tools and in real-time analyze, 
process and unearth from Big Data behavioral trajectories of criminal 
suspects, thereby finding crime patterns and trends so that we push 
for a transformation from retracing after the fact towards predicting, 
forewarning and preventing before the fact.  -   我们要善于运用智能
化手段，对大数据进行分析、处理、挖掘，实时关联犯罪嫌疑
人的行为轨迹，从中找到犯罪规律或趋势，推动由事后追溯向
事前预测预警预防转变.‘ (Meng Jianzhu 2016, 14).
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Meng’s successor since 2017 and former Minister of Public Security, Guo Shengkun, 
further elaborated in 2019 on the new focus of the Chinese security forces on predictive 
and preventive measures and specifically pointed towards three areas that should receive 
the most vigilant attention: 
 ‘Prediction, forewarning and prevention shall be a core task [of 
the zhengfa-Organs (i.e. courts, procuratorates, police, supervision 
commissions)] and [they shall] conscientiously work at bringing to 
light the roots and circumstances of serious dangers so that their 
realization can be precisely predicted and meticulously warned against 
and accurately prevented. [They shall] focus on the hidden dangers of 
prominent risks, take correct measures and firmly be on guard against, 
dissolve and handle every kind of risk in the field of political security 





While Guo also sees predictive policing as an instrument for maintaining stability, he 
additionally aligns this new form of policing with China’s authoritarian notion of public 
security by singling out political crimes and terrorism as the most important targets of 
predictive policing in China. As crimes against the political system as defined by the 
Chinese criminal law are regularly used to convict human rights lawyers (CHRLCG 
2016) or political dissidents like the late Liu Xiaobo and China’s ‘People’s War on 
Terror’ is a highly discriminatory criminal justice campaign that overwhelmingly targets 
its Muslim minority (Sprick 2020), Guo reaffirms that China will use its emerging 
capabilities of predictive policing against certain groups of people and not as a general 
tool for the reduction of crime.  
China Behind the Golden Shield in the Safe City and Under Sharp Eyes
The implementation of new policies in China is frequently introduced by a catchphrase 
that was coined by a leading politician or during a related working group meeting. In 
the field of public security and its technological turn, the three most important national 
policies are called ‘Golden Shield Project (金盾工程)’,  ‘Safe City (平安城市)’ and 
‘Sharp Eyes Project (雪亮工程)’, which will be exemplified here and illustrate some 
of China’s most ambitious public security reform projects of the last 30 years. These 
undertakings mainly aim at binding together previously separate areas of public security 
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and thereby also create a broad information basis that may in the future be employed 
for a nationwide predictive policing database. 
Probably the best-known policy with regard to the digitalization of the Chinese police 
is the Golden Shield Project, which Is mostly - but not entirely accurately - associated 
with China’s national firewall and its censorship of the Internet (Bolsover 2017, 
9-11). Internet safety and security was just one of many objectives this project wanted 
to achieve. Its overall approach was to find policing solutions for a more and more 
digitalized world, that is policing the emerging social realms of digital networks as 
well as using the digitalization of relevant information and its conversion in machine-
readable data. The most fundamental aim of the Golden Shield Project was to establish 
an operational data hub that integrates local, municipal, provincial and national 
networks of already existing security-related databases and equip those agencies, which 
were still disconnected either from digitally generating or retrieving relevant data 
with appropriate technological solutions (Li Runsen 2002, 7-11). The Golden Shield 
Project was originally designed to have two phases (2003-2006 and 2008-2015), but an 
additional third phase started in 2014 with a further investment of 10 Billion RMB (ca. 
1.3 Billion Euro) and the goal to streamline and reform existing processes and thusly 
establishing a comprehensive national network (Wan Yanan 2020). Ideally, the Golden 
Shield Project was meant to establish a coherent platform that provides public security 
organs with automatic analysis of retained bulk data and live information from video 
or electronic surveillance that could support the police in on-going investigations and 
additionally monitoring the general security situation in real-time (Schwarck 2018, 
11). While the data collection and management envisioned by the Golden Shield 
Project would thereby have been extremely conducive to the development of predictive 
policing in China, the necessity of an enormous subsequent investment in this project 
indicates substantial problems in the implementation of this policy. A section chief for 
technology at the Hangzhou police department recently summarized his experiences 
with the Golden Shield Project and elaborated on the existing problems, which – 
apart from serious trouble with the bandwidth capacity of his network – he primarily 
identified as deficiencies in the still existing data walls between different administrative 
units and lack of cooperation in data sharing and data use, many redundancies in a 
still too small data set, deficient search queries, too many platforms - as there were 8 
databases and 23 different networks with different data sets - and too little expertise 
and knowledge with regard to data tools among the police officers (Zou Xinyi 2010, 
44-5). While solely technical problems may be easily solved by further investments, 
an administrative culture that is predominantly occupied with retaining control over 
its domain may be a fairly unsurmountable obstacle. One of the 8 databases to be 
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integrated under the Golden Shield is the China Crime Information Center Database  
(全国违法犯罪信息中心查询索引库), which is modeled after the FBI’s National 
Crime Information Center. While information on this database is scarce, comprehensive 
data from criminal records would certainly be essential to its quality and operationality. 
Currently however, there is no unified system for criminal records, but these records are 
governed by a plethora of different local normative documents, doubtlessly producing a 
highly inconsistent data set of this quintessential information on criminal offenders (Yu 
Zhigang 2019, 73-5). The Golden Shield Project may one day become the backbone of 
China’s predictive policing, but its current state appears to be not yet feasible for such 
an endeavor.   
Two other important projects in the field of public security are the ‘Safe City (平安城
市)’ Project and the ‘Sharp Eyes Project (雪亮工程)’. Both projects use mass (video) 
surveillance measures for the purpose of constantly monitoring security- and safety-
related aspects. Safe City started on an experimental basis in 2005 and has expanded 
since into almost every major municipality in China. Its main goal is to extensively use 
video surveillance technology for different aspects of public security and safety. Criminal 
investigation and crime prevention are just one issue of many other aspects covered 
by this policy such as traffic control and management, emergency response operations 
or even safe production by surveilling construction sites. (Deng Ye 2016, Wan Yanan 
2020). Another feature of Safe City is the integration of the Internet of Things into the 
surveillance grid so that the public security forces have even more access by using e.g. 
privately installed surveillance cameras or car-mounted IP-cameras (Huawei 2015). 
Similarly to the Safe City, the Sharp Eyes Project, which was launched in 2015 and 
is currently implemented in 48 areas, is predominantly build on video surveillance 
technology but is not so much aiming at urban areas and instead focusses on covering 
the smaller cities and rural China. Additionally, and again just like Safe City, the 
Sharp Eyes Project uses mobile networks, cloud computing, centralized command 
centers and handheld devices. Under the Sharp Eyes Project the users of the latter are 
however not public security officers but mostly ordinary citizens who are using an app 
on their mobile devices to report on anything suspicious that they spotted on their 
television set, which can be tuned to the surveillance feed in their neighborhood, or 
that they encountered outside of their own home (Gao Guojun 2018, 125-6. Rudolph 
2019). While oscillating between promoting neighborhood watches and facilitating 
community suspicion and denunciation, the Sharp Eyes Project allows mass surveillance 
with very little human resources and only requires polices forces, if their dispatch is 
absolutely necessary, so that technology here is not the least seen as a cost-efficient tool 
for effective policing. Furthermore, the Sharp Eyes Project clearly demonstrates that 
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privacy concerns are hardly relevant in the area of public security in China, so that 
any future form of predictive policing will certainly not significantly be hampered by 
deliberations of this kind but can rather freely be built on a huge amount of surveillance 
data.   
Big Data and Experiments of Predictive Policing 
In the absence of a national predictive policing scheme in China, the recent 
establishment and operation of some local experimentation in this field are the focus 
of this section. Not every aspect discussed here strictly falls within the definitions of 
predictive poling used above, but these local projects are either advertised as predictive 
policing or must be understood as building blocks for a future predictive policing 
system. 
One regional hotspot for using Big Data and Predictive Policing tools is the province 
of Zhejiang and especially its capital Hangzhou. By quantitatively analyzing date from 
e.g. police intelligence or occurrence rates of certain cases, Zhejiang is committed to 
establish a ‘Public Security Assessment and Warning (社会治安评估预警)’ scheme 
so that hidden public security risks are recognized and prevented (Ministry of Public 
Security 2016). For this purpose, Zhejiang is building an enormous database, which in 
late 2019 already consisted of more than 600 different data categories, held more than 
1.6 Trillion data points, and is constantly fed by almost 250 cloud-based services across 
the province so that the central data center of the police daily has to compile traffic of 
1 Billion real-time data points. An early test of the new technologies employed by the 
Zhejiang security forces came when its capital Hangzhou hosted the G20 summit in 
2016. This Police Cloud (警务云), that was in operation here, can be used to retrieve 
a wide array of personal data that can be linked to the national identification number 
(身份证号码), which according to Human Rights Watch includes medical records, 
delivery histories, hotel stays or travelling companions (HRW 2017). What appeared 
to Western commentators as an utterly disproportionate show of force during the G20 
summit in Hangzhou and thus painted a bleak picture of personal freedoms (Yoon 
2016) was portrayed by Chinese officials as a full-blown success of its ‘Intelligent Public 
Security (智慧公安)’ based on its Big Data capabilities (Zhejiang Police Department 
2019). One core objective of the G20 operation was evidently keeping away petitioners, 
who would have intended to use an internationalized stage to voice their dissent and 
bring forward their grievances about the regime’s many injustices (RFI 2016). Later 
court cases subsequently showed that the police had stopped and fined many potential 
petitioners before they could have staged their protest in Hangzhou (e.g. Hefei 
Intermediate Court 2018), so that, from the perspective of the Chinese authorities, the 
309Daniel Sprick
predictive and preventing policing tactics must be considered successful. This example 
however also highlights that the aforementioned purpose of predictive policing in 
China, namely preventing ‘political crimes’ and ‘maintaining social stability’, has to be 
understood as an extremely effective tool for the suppression of dissidents in China. 
A particularly hot topic in China is the crime of telecommunication fraud, of 
which more than 200.000 cases were registered in 2019 alone (Bejing Daily 2019). 
Subsequently, the Ministry of Public Security orchestrated a criminal justice campaign 
titled ‘Cloud Sword (云剑)’ that targeted this particular crime and once again it was 
the province of Zhejiang, which was particularly successful, so that in this province 
alone 160 Million RMB in fraudulently acquired assets were seized until December 
2019 (Zhu Ziyang 2019). Zhejiang had established specific models for the prediction 
and prevention of telecommunication fraud on municipal levels that involves strict 
surveillance of any suspicious online or telecommunication activities and close 
coordination down to the local police station so that real-time monitoring of fraudulent 
activities and immediate warnings of potential victims seems to be possible (Wang 
Shujing 2019). The police forces thereby also rely on the active participation of private 
companies such as the Zhejiang-based Alibaba Group for e.g. the identification 
of possible suspects (Wu Yuewen 2019, 93). A similar approach in targeting 
telecommunication fraud is reported from the city of Zhongshan in Guangdong 
province, which is another area for experimental predictive policing measures. In one 
instance, the Zhongshan police were able to warn a potential victim and apprehend the 
corresponding suspect in less than four hours after the attempted fraud commenced. 
A telephone card, flagged for possible connections with drug-related crimes and 
mafia-related money laundering, came on the radar of the automated system when 
the cardholder had sent a text message to a Mrs. Zheng directing her to a website that 
asked inter alia for her national identification and banking card numbers. Because Mrs. 
Zheng could not be reached by phone at the time, police officers from the local station 
were immediately dispatched and arrived before she disclosed her sensitive information. 
Within just the year 2018, the Zhongshan police had placed 9120 warning calls of 
this kind (Mai Wanhua 2019, 23) in a city of roughly 3 Million people which again 
illustrates the enormous dimensions of telecommunication fraud in China and also 
highlights the vast extent of this predictive policing operation. In this instance, actual 
security concerns of the population are the driving force of predictive policing in China, 
while privacy issues are much less relevant in this mass surveillance effort, which can be 
seen by the fact that the Zhongshan police intercepted more than 13000 telephone calls 
and more than 30000 text messages in 2017 alone (Zhongshan Daily 2018).           
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The Zhongshan police force is also using another rater innovative method for its version 
of predictive policing as it employs wastewater analysis in its fight against drug crimes. 
In collaboration with Peking University, Zhongshan was the first municipality in China 
to systematically test sewage water across the city since 2017 and started to build a data 
analysis model that also included water and electricity use for the purpose of identifying 
hot spots for drug crimes. Until 2019, this approach led to the arrest of 341 suspects 
in 45 different criminal investigations (Zhongshan Daily 2018). When one particular 
district in Zhongshan produced suspicious data in its electricity use, the wastewater 
analysis however falsified drug-related crimes so that the Zhongshan than successfully 
shifted its focus and found a hotspot for telecommunication fraud (Zheng Zehui 2019, 
18). Such a nuanced approach is however not always maintained as the Zhongshan 
police force also followed up on its wastewater analysis by simply conducting hair-
sample tests of 22530 persons working in the local nightlife industry, which produced 
356 positive tests for substance abuse and led to the arrest of 17 people (Mai Wanhua 
2019, 24). The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction recently 
commissioned a study which assessed the applicability and potential advantages of 
‘wastewater-based epidemiology’ (WBE) and found it highly useful for determining and 
addressing public health issues, while the study also ascertained that the use of WBE 
for law enforcement purposes should be primarily as a tool to evaluate its effectiveness 
and warned against ‘ethical risks’ of targeting certain communities (EMCDDA 2020, 
7-9). The latter concerns were obviously not relevant in Zhongshan as exhibited by 
targeting an entire group of people, which was clearly intended to boost the perceived 
effectiveness of its innovative methods. 
Reports on predictive policing in China by Western commentators mainly focus on 
China’s pervasive mass surveillance campaign against its Muslim population in Xinjiang 
(Yuan Yang 2019). As mentioned above, this correlates with many assertions from 
China that the fight against terrorism is one of the main scopes of application for 
high-tech policing so that future terrorist attacks may be predicted and prevented (e.g. 
Guo 2019). Information on the on-going operation in Xinjiang is however scarce and 
rather deal with conceptual issues of terrorism in the crosshair of predictive policing 
methods (e.g. Li Zhiheng, Yao Bo 2019). While the true predictive facilities of the 
Chinese authorities are unclear, the scope and intrusiveness of its surveillance measures 
were inter alia exposed by the China Cables of the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) or related reports from Human Rights Watch (HRW). 
The ICIJ revealed, e.g., that more than 40.000 users of a file-sharing app (Zapya – 快
牙) who used the app to share religious content were further investigated under the 
ominous ‘de-extremization (去极端化)’ policy that could easily lead to ‘assisted or 
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placed education 帮教、安置教育’ or the like in one of China’s internment camps 
(Alecci 2019). HRW was also able to obtain a police app that connects to the Integrated 
Joint Operations Platform (一体化联合作战平台), which is a core infrastructure of 
the mass surveillance in Xinjiang. Reverse engineering of said app showed that Chinese 
authorities are collecting a huge amount of personal data that even encompass aspects 
like ‘not socializing with the neighbors, often avoiding using the front door’, it appears 
to flag certain targets (persons), follows their movement and even may dispatch the 
police if these targets enter certain geographies (HRW 2019). While the underlying 
algorithms and their more nuanced predictive capabilities remain unclear, it is evident 
that China’s security forces enhanced their real-time response skills that are based on 
data collected through mass surveillance.                
Systemic Pitfalls for Predictive Policing in China
China is doubtlessly heavily investing in its predictive policing capabilities. This follows 
a well-established implementation course that entails the highest political support 
and declarations of intent, which feed into local trials and experimentation and will 
probably lead up to a galvanized national strategy. Predictive Policing fits very well 
into China’s greater scheme of using technology to update and bolster its approach of 
social governance and public security. China’s authoritarian regime may be considered 
extremely conducive to the establishment of predictive policing models as its paramount 
objective of security will always trump any concerns regarding privacy issues, due 
process or an unduly amount of false-positives. Additionally, the use of presumably 
unbiased technology may support the regime’s recent efforts to raise its legitimacy by 
suppressing corruptive practices of its administration. This chapter will however discuss 
substantial and systemic flaws and risks which predictive policing may face in China. Its 
underlying data cannot be trusted and effective as well as appropriate police operations 
and interventions that sustainably reduce crime and not only target certain groups 
may be almost impossible to establish. Especially, the imperative of constant evaluation 
of the established predictive policing mechanisms, which has to be based on critical 
reflection, transparency and the willingness to engage in an open-ended process without 
fixed expectations regarding the results (Fergusen 2017b, 1165-80), may not be an 
approach available to the Chinese system. 
Predictive Policing and Chinese Police Data
An old saying in information technologies is ‘garbage in, garbage out’ and describes the 
limitation of computerized data management systems, which are highly dependent on 
the quality of their input. In her seminal work, O’Neill reiterates the validity of this 
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notion for automated scoring systems and highlights their affinity to error (2016, 150-
1), which may then sustain feedback loops that lock in doubtful decisions and even 
exponentiate their harmful consequences as the first erroneous decision may trigger a 
cascade of additional errors in interlinked areas that the respective system also monitors 
(Robinson 2017, 320-2). In the field of predictive policing, Bennet Moses and Chan 
point out that ‘predictions can accordingly become self-affirming’ (2018, 810) as more 
policing of certain areas or communities produces more, corresponding data that is fed 
into the machine. Barocas and Selbst argue that ‘data mining can reproduce existing 
patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision-makers, or simply 
reflect the widespread biases that persist in society’ (2016, 674). Effective and fair 
predictive policing therefore requires high quality data and data management schemes 
that are unreservedly acknowledging their errors and putting a lot of effort in addressing 
and mitigating these errors (Ferguson 2017b, 1151-2).  
If China currently holds or is able to produce such a data set in the future is highly 
questionable. Not the least because official crime data in China is a matter of highest 
political sensitivity. From the perspective of the central government, crime rates are 
not only an issue discussed in terms of safety and security but also pose a threat to 
the regime’s legitimacy and undermine, in the words of Dutton and Xu, its ‘socialist 
face’ (2005, 125). Additionally, Xu Jianhua was able to show that crime statistics are 
seriously manipulated locally as the number of reported crimes are part of the police’s 
evaluation so that newly established police commissioners first artificially inflated their 
local crime rates so that they could then show their success by a distinctive downward 
trend in reported crime (2018, 166-9). Furthermore, in an empirical study, Mou Yu 
demonstrated that the police in China can easily manipulate its dossiers, which are 
hardly ever successfully challenged in court, and thus make them fit their version 
of the truth which may ‘relate to stereotyping, intuition or imagination in specific 
circumstances’ and is predominantly ‘based upon the probability of conviction (2017, 
77). The lack of reliable official data is also frequently acknowledged by Chinese 
criminologists, who additionally encounter many difficulties collecting their own data 
and conducting their research in China (Zhang 2013, 171-77). Quite tellingly, it is 
therefore not surprising that a recent study published in Chinese in a Chinese journal 
by Chinese academics on a possible algorithm for crime prediction is using data from 
Chicago and not from any Chinese locality (Tang, Shi, Zhang 2018, 223).
It may be possible that the high volume of data collected through nearly ubiquitous 
surveillance by the police could create an extremely valuable data set for predictive 
policing in China. But as truly raw data generally does not exist and given the 
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aforementioned problems in the collection, production and interpretation of crime-
related data in China, it is highly doubtful that a database can be constructed in China 
that allows for an effective (in the sense of crime reducing) and fair (in the sense of 
minimizing errors) predictive policing in the foreseeable future. This is not to say that 
China will not be able to establish its version of predictive policing, but this will rather 
perpetuate and probably even exponentiate its already highly problematic policing 
practices as discussed below.      
Predictive Policing and Chinese Police Operation    
Putting predictive policing into practice does not only involve data management 
and coding predictive algorithms, but it is also a question of the appropriate police 
operation. Even if a specific crime or crime pattern is predicted for a certain area 
or yet more advanced, if a specific person is identified as a likely criminal offender 
for certain crimes about to happen, this does not necessarily entail that the right 
police intervention is also available (Bennet Moses, Chan 2016, 813). Simple police 
deployment may be considered the prime intervention to prevent the crime and thereby 
satisfy the system’s own logic so that ‘the metrics being established may be consistent 
with the technology, but not the ultimate goal of crime reduction’ (Ferguson 2017b, 
1176). Problem-oriented responses may in contrast more comprehensively target the 
predicted crime and its root causes, but this requires extremely adaptive police tactics 
that proficiently use its predictive tools in the sense of understanding the technology’s 
mechanisms and critically reflect on its analytical output (Bennet Moses, Chan 2016, 
814-5).
The complexities of Big Data and predictive policing technologies are a huge stumbling 
block for their implementation in China as elsewhere in the world. Introducing data-
driven policing and intelligence-led police work requires not only investments into 
the equipment but also in the training of the new and already existing police force. 
Additionally, the Chinese police are already struggling with the implementation of 
new policing tactics (Wang, Zhao 2016, 534) as many police officers are already highly 
frustrated with their ever changing role and duties over the last 40 years of criminal 
justice reform, the high pressure from above and their very limited influence on the 
course of police reforms (Scoggins, O’Brien 2016, 227-8).  A common theme in the 
Chinese literature on the core problems of the implementation of Big Data approaches 
to contemporary policing during the last ten years is therefore the assertion that neither 
beat cops nor the commanding officers had sufficient data literacy (Zou Xinyi 2010, 
44-5, Wu Zhihui et al. 2017, 103; Lin Guan, Hao Sun 2020, 75-6). This gives also rise 
to the problem that existing command structures may perceive themselves challenged 
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by the new technology or the newly established operators and would try to retain full 
control over the actual police operation (Lin Guan, Hao Sun 2020, 76). This kind of 
internal competition can also be seen in the field of data sharing. While this issue was 
among the core objectives since the implementation of the Golden Shield Project in 
2003, corresponding problems have not yet disappeared so that data sharing among 
different levels of the police hierarchy as well as among the public security apparatus 
and other administrative organs is still highly deficient (Wu Zhiui et al. 2017, 103; Lin 
Guan, Hao Sun 2020, 76).     
As mentioned above, the Chinese police are heavily guided by its constant evaluation 
and the establishment of specific predictive policing metrics will certainly have 
significant impact on police operation. The two most common police tactics in China 
are still its socialist version of community policing (Wong 2001) and campaign-style 
policing that leads to ‘severe and swift punishments’ by identifying the targets of 
the campaign, by accelerating the responses and by bolstering the campaign with a 
propaganda blitz (Trevaskes 2010, 64-6). Hot-spot policing as the most accepted police 
tactic for geographical predictive policing does however not belong to the arsenal of the 
Chinese police, because, according to Wang and Zhao, there are simply no significant 
crime hot spots in China (2016, 532-3). Predictive policing in general is still far from 
being a ubiquitous panacea but very selectively and discretionary employed by the 
police (Joh 2016, 30-1), so that China’s approach of targeting specific crimes as seen in 
its current experiments and respective political statements will be the prevailing practice 
for the foreseeable future. Terrorism and political crimes are repeatedly identified 
targets of China’s predictive policing and thereby complement its campaign-style police 
operation in these areas, so that this new technology is most certainly used further 
suppress dissent in China (HRW 2017). Furthermore, in the case of drug-related 
crimes, China’s use of WBE will predict crimes and the police will have to prevent 
(those) crimes in order to meet the corresponding evaluation metrics, even if this entails 
a campaign-style drug testing operation of an entire community as seen in Zhongshan. 
Ticking the boxes of the predictive policing tool and thereby fulfilling the requirement 
of effectively using the new technology will be more important than crime reduction. 
This effect will be further exacerbated as the Chinese police do generally not engage 
in problem-oriented policing (Wang, Zhao 2016, 532), which would make use of the 
WBE in also addressing drug problems as a public health issue and thereby respond 
to the underlying root problem of drug-related crimes. While the predictive policing 
against telecommunication fraud by the Chinese police should also be understood as 
campaign-style policing, this operation demonstrates that the seemingly unfettered 
surveillance of private (telecommunication) data of its citizens can be extremely helpful 
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in predicting and preventing this kind of crime. From this perspective, China would be 
in the position to very effectively employ predictive policing methods at least in areas, 
where data flows can be monitored and where the flow of data is part of the criminal 
activity.         
Policing Predictive Policing in China
The single most important issue stressed in many publications on predictive policing 
is the need to establish rigorous evaluation mechanisms and clarify accountability for 
technology-led police operations. This is especially true as the experiences in the US 
with predictive policing so far produced inconclusive results regarding their effectiveness 
(Bennet Moses, Chan 2016, 815-6) and are easily corrupted by ‘self-reinforcing or self-
fulling predictions’ (Ferguson 2017b, 1178). There may also be the tendency that the 
high publicity value of establishing ‘smart policing’ based on modern technology and 
Big Data analysis, that will advance the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the police 
force, may cloud the judgement of decision-makers and prevents critical reflection 
and evaluation of predictive policing (Ferguson 2017a, 28-31). Additionally, using 
predictive policing tools may ‘outsource aspects of the decision-making process, and 
thus responsibility and accountability for the decision itself ’ (Bennet Moses, Chan 
2016, 817). The machine could be easily blamed for every fraught or erroneous police 
intervention without holding the police itself accountable. Taking accountability, 
however, requires transparency regarding the methodology of the prediction and its 
impact on the corresponding police operation as well as technological expertise of at 
least the commanding officers, who need to fully understand the computed output of 
the prediction tool (Ferguson 2017, 1166-9). 
Full accountability and transparency for internal police mechanism is not only in 
China hard to achieve. Chinese police culture is however extremely averse to external or 
internal oversight. The Chinese police law (Art. 42) establishes the procuratorate as the 
primary supervisory body of the police in China, but ‘in reality, the prosecutor and the 
police are closely aligned and collaborate with one another’ (Mou Yu 2017, 83) and the 
police are generally accepted as being more powerful than the procuratorate or even the 
courts in China (Xu Jianhua 2013, 1110). Given the nature of predictive policing as a 
tool to inform police tactics and operations, internal oversight would appear to be more 
suitable to create accountability. While such a system exists in China, Wong provides 
a disastrous summary of its efficacy as it is conducted ‘most of the time […] in a very 
superficial and perfunctory manner’ and the respective inspection teams are ‘grossly 
understaffed, undertrained, and inadequately resourced’ (2013, 333). Such a weak 
internal police supervision is described as still in its nascent state and it has certainly 
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not yet the ability to effectively reign in a public security apparatus, that is built on a 
culture of defending the socialist revolution against its enemies (Ma Yue 2008, 50-1). 
This gross lack of accountability may even fuel the use of computerized decision-making 
processes in police operations as the technology can be portrayed as unbiased and 
incorruptible. The employment of predictive policing tools may be propagandized as 
a means to reduce human error or misconduct, which then again positively reflects on 
the police’s and by association the regime’s legitimacy. A critical evaluation of predictive 
policing would be counterproductive to this particular cause. Given the fact, that the 
technological expertise in the commanding levels of the Chinese police, as mentioned 
above, additionally appears to be still highly deficient, a nuanced supervision of 
predictive policing tools in China appears illusionary. Predictive policing can therefore 
easily become more of a propaganda instrument than a means for crime reduction.         
Conclusion
China’s future in predictive policing is fraught with substantial risks regarding its 
effectiveness in reducing crime. In technologically upgrading its system of social 
governance in general and its public security apparatus in particular, the Chinese 
regime envisions a boost in legitimacy as seemingly unbiased and incorruptible systems 
promise fairness and justice within the allowed parameters of the one-party state. The 
propagandistic value of predictive policing may however be the single most important 
end possibly even unsurmountable obstacle in establishing an effective crime reducing 
system of this kind in China. The Chinese security apparatus appears systemically 
unfit to critically evaluate, acknowledge error, re-adjust methodologies and adapt 
responses, which is an indispensable process in making predictive policing work. If 
predictive policing is however not only seen as a tool for the general reduction of 
crime but used as an instrument to further target specific (dissident) groups, China 
may be able to successfully employ Big Data technology for this particular objective. 
Furthermore, while actual crime data in China is significantly flawed so that systemic 
crime predictions seem at the moment impossible, China’s huge surveillance operations 
produce an enormous flow of data that could be tapped into for specific campaign-
style police interventions as seen in the fight against telecommunication fraud. It is safe 
to assume that predictions will be made on a large scale in China and the police will 
respond to these predictions. It is however not conceivable that this technology will 
substantially change police operation and police culture in China, it will rather amplify 
pervasiveness and bias of its practices.    
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